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FEDERAL WDICIAL SELECTION IN THE 
FOURTH CIRCUIT 
CARL TOBIAS* 
Professor Tobias assesses federal judicial selection for the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for North 
Carolina. His Essay ascertains that four of fifteen active 
judgeships that Congress has authorized for the court have 
remained vacant over a considerable period and that a seat 
designated for North Carolina has been unfilled for seven years. 
He finds that these judicial vacancies may affect the appellate 
justice which the Fourth Circuit delivers and that North Carolina 
deserves. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal judicial selection in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit has proven highly controversial over the last 
decade. The appointment of appellate judges to this court has 
provoked charges and countercharges among members of the United 
States Senate who represent states located in the Fourth Circuit. 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), for example, blocked Senate 
consideration of two African-Americans, United States District Judge 
James A. Beaty, Jr., and North Carolina Court of Appeals Chief 
Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., whom President Bill Clinton nominated.1 
Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.) may prevent the Senate from 
processing the nomination of United States District Judge Terrence 
Boyle, whose name President George W. Bush submitted in May 
2001 at the apparent behest of Senator Helms.2 The court also has a 
second "North Carolina" seat that is open and for which the 
President has not proposed anyone. On July 20, 2001, Judge Roger 
Gregory became the first African-American member of the Fourth 
Circuit, but the Senate confirmed him only after President Clinton 
accorded Gregory a recess appointment and Virginia's Republican 
Senators suggested President Bush nominate Gregory.3 Moreover, 
1. See, e.g., David Firestone, With New Administration, Partisan Battle Resumes Over 
a Federal Appeals Bench, N.Y. TIMEs, May 21, 2001, at A13; John Monk, Hatch Raps N. C. 
4th Circuit Candidate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 1996, at 2B; David G. Savage, 
Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for 80 in the Senate, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2001, at A12. 
2. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner, Placing Bets on Bush Bench, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 
2002, at 1; John Wagner, Panel Would Suggest Nominees, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), June 19, 2002, at B5. 
3. Senator George Allen stated that Gregory had an "inspirational story" and a 
"proper judicial philosophy," while Senator John Warner characterized Gregory's 
confirmation as an "historic moment." See Alison Mitchell, Senators Confirm 3 Judges, 
Including Once-Stalled Black, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at A16; see also Brooke A. 
Masters, Battle Brewing Over 4th Circuit Nominees, WASH. POST, May 5, 2001, at A6 
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Maryland's Democratic Senators stopped the nomination of Peter 
Keisler to the appellate court because President Bush had not 
consulted them and because the candidate never practiced law in 
Maryland.4 
Although Congress has authorized fifteen active judgeships for 
the Fourth Circuit, the tribunal presently experiences four judicial 
vacancies, which means that the Sixth Circuit is the only appeals court 
that now has a higher percentage of empty seats.5 The Fourth 
Circuit's Chief Judge, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., has testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee that the appellate court operates 
efficaciously without its complete judicial complement.6 The tribunal, 
however, affords oral arguments in thirty percent of the appeals 
terminated on the merits and publishes opinions in only eleven 
percent.7 The first statistic ties for the smallest and the second is the 
lowest of the twelve regional circuits; these data raise significant 
questions about the appellate justice that the appeals court delivers. 
Indeed, one Fourth Circuit position authorized by Congress during 
1990 was not occupied until the Senate confirmed Gregory in 2001, 
while a North Carolina seat on the court has remained unfilled for 
seven years.8 
All of the above propositions suggest that federal judicial 
selection for the Fourth Circuit is increasingly controversial, 
contentious, and important, and it warrants assessment. This Essay 
undertakes such an effort. First, it evaluates the historical 
background of the problems that have accompanied appointments to 
the tribunal. The Essay then analyzes possible solutions to these 
(affording background of Gregory's confirmation). 
4. See generally Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Nominate 11 to Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 
9, 2001, at A24 (reporting that Peter Keisler, an expected nominee, was not nominated 
because of a dispute with Democratic Senators); David Savage, Bush Picks 11 for Federal 
Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at Al (reporting that Keisler, the expected nominee for 
a Maryland seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, was not 
included in President Bush's nominations). 
5. VACANCIES IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (July 30, 2002), at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm {last visited Aug. 2, 2002) (on file 
\vi th the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter VACANCIES]. 
6. Most relevant to the issues that I consider in this Essay is Conserving Judicial 
Resources: Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. 
Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary]. 
7. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF 
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT, 22 tbls.2-6 to 2-7 (1998). 
8. See VACANCIES, supra note 5; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text 
(discussing Gregory's appointment). 
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problems, emphasizing approaches each political branch may institute 
that would remedy or ameliorate the complications that will attend 
the future choices of Fourth Circuit judges generally and from North 
Carolina specifically. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Introduction 
An examination of the origins and growth of the phenomena that 
have made Fourth Circuit judicial selection controversial can inform 
comprehension of the Fourth Circuit and of the problems that have 
accompanied the court's appointments. Because pertinent 
developments in this court are inextricably intertwined with events 
across the country, consultation of national considerations also yields 
instructive perspectives on the Fourth Circuit. For example, the 
continuing dispute in North Carolina resembles an ongoing Michigan 
controversy. Two Clinton nominees from Michigan never received 
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, and Democratic Senators have 
stymied consideration of four Bush nominees who live in that state.9 
Moreover, the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have 
experienced similarly large numbers of openings at various times 
since 1995.10 Republican Senators may have found that the political 
views of several Clinton Ninth Circuit nominees were too liberal, just 
as Democratic Senators might now deem certain Bush Fourth and 
Sixth Circuit nominees overly conservative. Thus, although the 
Fourth Circuit is not necessarily representative, selection efforts there 
have encountered obstacles that closely resemble those manifested in 
other courts. 
B. National Developments 
Nationwide developments, which have implicated Fourth Circuit 
appointments, are subtle and complex, and a relatively 
comprehensive assessment can enhance understanding of Fourth 
Circuit judicial selection.11 There are two principal constituents to the 
9. See, e.g., Jonathan Groner & Jonathan Ringel, Judicial Nominee Horsetrading 
Heats Up As Confirmation Process Gets Weighed, AM. LAW MEDIA, Aug. 31, 2001, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZ0136F2RC 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Savage, supra 
note 1. 
10. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling The Federal Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit, 
19 REV. LmG. 233, 234 {2000); Groner, supra note 2. 
11. For thorough examinations of national developments, see MILLER CTR. COMM'N 
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difficulty involving the selection of federal judges. One component is 
the persistent vacancies conundrum, which derived from 
congressional expansion of federal court jurisdiction and sharp rises 
in appeals over the past several decades.12 This dynamic fostered the 
appellate judiciary's growth, thus increasing the number and 
frequency of vacancies and complicating attempts to fill them. The 
second constituent is the current political impasse that resulted in 
substantial measure from control of the presidency and the Senate by 
opposing political parties since the late 1980s.13 This Essay 
emphasizes the second problem because it better explains the 
complications accompanying Fourth Circuit selection.14 
1. The Persistent Vacancies Conundrum 
The permanent vacancies problem can be traced to the nation's 
founding and to Article II of the United States Constitution. This 
Essay, however, focuses on the conundrum's modern features, 
attributed to enlarged federal court jurisdiction and docket growth 
that prompted authorization of numerous, new judgeships. These 
features increased the number and frequency of the vacancies and the 
difficulty of filling them. 
ON THE SELECTION OF FED. JUDGES, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING 
FEDERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE 
SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter MILLER REPORT]; Gordon 
Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 
14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994). I rely substantially in this Essay on Carl Tobias, Federal 
Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527 (1998). Much in 
that article remains relevant, although the political parties' circumstances are reversed. 
12. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3; see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari 
and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268-70 (1996). 
See generally Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the 
Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11 (assessing these and related ideas). 
13. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 528; see also Thomas 0. Sargentich, Report of the 
Task Force on Federal Judicial Selection of Citizens For Independent Courts, 51 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1031, 1033-34 (1999) (recognizing this phenomenon). See generally MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1996) (assessing the phenomenon of divided 
government). 
14. The persistent vacancies problem deserves less analysis because much delay in 
selection is inherent and, thus, resists treatment, political factors contribute less to the 
persistent problem than the current impasse, and the vacancies problem has been assessed 
elsewhere. See, e.g., Bermant et al., supra note 11 (examining causes of, and proposing 
solutions to, persistent judicial vacancies); Committee on Federal Courts, Remedying the 
Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary-The Problem of Judicial Vacancies 
and Its Causes, 42 REC. AsS'N B. CITY N.Y. 374 (1987) [hereinafter The Problem of 
Judicial Vacancies] (analyzing the constant problem of judicial vacancies and offering 
potential solutions); Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 
JUDICATURE 185 (1993) (discussing the state of judicial gridlock inherent in the federal 
judicial system and possible solutions). 
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a. The Early History 
The Founders expressly provided, and consciously envisioned, 
that politics would play a major role in judicial selection.Is The 
Appointments Clause in Article II states that the President "shall 
nominate, and by and \vith the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint" judges.I6 Numerous Framers contemplated that 
Senators would serve as a beneficial check on the President's spirit of 
favoritism and would minimize selection of unfit individuals while 
functioning as an effective source of stability. I7 
Senate members have been actively involved in the process since 
the republic's early days because they have an important stake in 
influencing, or seeming to affect, selection.Is Complex political 
accommodations between the Senate and the President during the 
nascent stages have facilitated the regime's smooth operation.19 
Moreover, Senators traditionally have participated in choosing 
nominees, especially for the federal district courts. Senators, or 
senior elected officials of the President's political party, from the state 
in which the judge will sit, typically have suggested individuals whom 
the President then has nominated.20 
Politics, accordingly, permeate judicial selection. If the President 
and Senators differ, they may behave tactically to secure advantage 
and to exercise control over nomination and confirmation, even using 
15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961). For more analysis of this history, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 28 (2000); Albert P. Melone, The Senate's Confirmation Role in 
Supreme Court Nominations and the Politics of Ideology Versus Impartiality, 75 
JUDICATURE 68, 69-70 (1991). 
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Constitution assigns the President and the 
Senate much larger roles than the House of Representatives and the courts. "The 
President" includes Executive Branch officials, such as attorneys in the White House 
Counsel's Office and the Department of Justice, who help the president. "The Senate" 
includes the Judiciary Committee, which has primary responsibility for the confirmation 
process, and its chair, Senator Patrick Leahy (R-Vt.); the Majority Leader, Senator 
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.); and individual Senate members. 
17. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 26-29; Tobias, supra note 11, at 530. 
18. See HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 
(1972). 
19. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 321. For historical analysis of this and related 
ideas, see GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 29-34; Melone, supra note 16. 
20. Lawrence Walsh, President Dwight Eisenhower's Deputy Attorney General, 
found it difficult to confirm nominees opposed by a Senator from that nominee's 
respective state. Lawrence E. Walsh, The Federal Judiciary ... Progress and the Road 
Ahead, 43 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 155, 156 (1960); see also MILLER REPORT, supra 
note 11, at 4 (including Attorney General Robert Kennedy's description of Senate 
appointment with President's advice and consent). 
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delay for strategic reasons.21 Illustrative of these ideas are Senator 
Helms's efforts in blocking consideration of Clinton nominees from 
North Carolina and Senator Edwards's apparent reluctance to afford 
Chief Judge Boyle a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.22 Tension 
involving the President and Senate members will likely be a 
permanent fixture, as long as the chamber's advice and consent 
remains a prerequisite for appointment.23 
In short, the President and Senators have traditionally shared 
considerable responsibility for choosing judges in a process that has 
been politicized since the nation was created. Nevertheless, large 
numbers of openings, which remain vacant for extended periods, only 
evolved into a significant difficulty during the 1970s. Indeed, between 
the date that Congress adopted the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the last 
third of the twentieth century, the total complement of appeals and 
district court judgeships only gradually increased to 300; thus, the 
rather few openings and their comparative infrequency promoted the 
expeditious filling of empty seats, and, therefore, minimized the 
problem which eventually materialized.24 
b. History Since 1950 
Federal court jurisdiction expanded dramatically in the latter half 
of the twentieth century.25 Congress adopted numerous new civil 
causes of actions and federalized much criminal behavior, prompting 
a 300 percent yearly rise in district court cases after the 1950s.26 
Lawmakers responded by increasing the number of federal judges to 
address docket growth; thus, there are now 844 active appellate and 
district judgeships.27 
The Committee on Long Range Planning of the United States 
Judicial Conference, in a thorough 1995 study of the federal courts' 
21. See CHASE, supra note 18, at 14, 40; Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 321. 
22. See supra note 2; infra notes 137-139 and accompanying text. 
23. There are apparently two avenues "out of that requirement. One requires 
constitutional interpretation, the other constitutional amendment." Bermant et al., supra 
note 11, at 322. 
24. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 531; MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3. 
25. See supra note 12. 
26. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3; see, e.g., Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 13701-14223 (2000)) (stating purpose as "to control and prevent crime"); Americans 
With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101-12213 (2000)). See generally William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical 
Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (1995) (assessing increased federalization of criminal 
behavior). 
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2000); see also VACANCIES, supra note 5. 
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future, prognosticated that mounting dockets would require 2,300 
active judges by 2010 and 4,070 by 2020.28 The judiciary will continue 
to expand, in part because Congress will likely not restrict civil or 
criminal jurisdiction,29 even though enlarging the bench is quite 
controversial.30 The Committee also determined that the period for 
filling vacancies had grown.31 Between 1980 and 1995, nominations 
on average required a year and confirmations three months.32 
Moreover, the time period required for both aspects appeared to be 
lengthening.33 A Federal Judicial Center ("FJC") analysis found that 
vacancy rates from 1970 until 1992 nearly doubled in the federal 
district courts and were more than twice as high in the federal 
appellate courts, while most delay happened between the time when a 
seat became open and nomination.34 
The evaluation above shows that politics has been a perennial 
feature of the selection process.35 Nevertheless, certain observers of 
judicial appointments contend that the system has become 
increasingly politicized since the 1960s.36 They assert that this 
development originated in the administration of President Richard 
Nixon, who promised to reattain "law and order" by naming judicial 
conservatives and "strict constructionists,''37 although a more 
contemporary strain can be traced to the Senate's rejection of Circuit 
28. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN]. The Long Range 
Planning Committee predicted that 1,370 judgeships would be required by 2000, however 
Congress did not authorize those positions, partly for political reasons, as is evidenced by 
its failure to pass a comprehensive judgeships bill since 1990. 
29. For these and related ideas see Stephen G. Breyer, Administering Justice in the 
First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 29, 34-37 (1990); Marshall, supra note 26; William L. 
Reynolds & William M. Richman, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem 
for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELLL. REV. 273, 297, 325-334 (1996). 
30. Compare Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, 
Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (calling for more judges) with Gerald Bard 
Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70 (opposing additional judges). 
31. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 28, at 102-05; see also infra note 75 and 
accompanying text. 
32. MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-4. 
33. Id. 
34. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 323. 
35. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text. 
36. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE 
1\VENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 (1988); Roger E. 
Hartley & Lisa M. Holmes, Increasing Senate Scrutiny of Lower Federal Court Nominees, 
80 JUDICATURE 274, 274 (1997). 
37. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 36, at 20; Tobias, supra note 11, at 532. 
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Judge Robert Bork whom President Ronald Reagan had nominated 
for the Supreme Court in 1987.38 
i. The Basic Framework of Modern Judicial Selection 
State Senators or the highest-ranking officials of the President's 
political party may participate in choosing appeals court nominees; 
however, recent Presidents have limited their roles and assumed 
greater responsibility.39 Designees must complete three lengthy 
questionnaires for the Department of Justice, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and the American Bar Association ("ABA") Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary, which has assessed candidates' 
professional qualifications for a half-century.40 Justice Department 
and White House officials first screen, then assess, and finally 
interview the potential nominees, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation ("FBI") conducts background investigations and 
security checks on the individuals.41 
If these reviews prove satisfactory, the President formally 
nominates the candidates and submits their names to the Senate.42 
Some private entities, including the Free Congress Foundation and 
the Alliance for Justice, which monitor judicial selection, generally 
evaluate nominees at this juncture, as does the ABA Committee that 
participated earlier in the process.43 The Senate, primarily through 
the Judiciary Committee, investigates and analyzes the nominees, 
38. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The Bush Administration and Appeals Court Nominees, 10 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 103, 105 (2001); Sargentich, supra note 13, at 1033-34. For 
more analysis of Bork's rejection, see STEPHEN CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS 
132-33 (1994); MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT 
OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT 
(1992). 
39. The officers often begin the district court process by proposing candidates. 
MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, 
at 375. Each specific presidential administration varies these fundamental procedures 
somewhat. See, e.g., CHASE, supra note 18, at 6-7; SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING 
FEDERAL JUDGES: LoWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 
3-14 (1997); O'BRIEN, supra note 36, at 49-64. 
40. The ABA has received criticism for being overly political and too slow, but it has 
performed a valuable service in assessing nominees. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, 
at 5-6, 8, 11. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WORKS (1988) (analyzing the ABA's 
role). 
41. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, 
supra note 14, at 375. 
42. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; Tobias, supra note 11, at 533. 
43. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 217-29; supra note 40; infra notes 91-92 
and accompanying text. 
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accords the individuals hearings, and votes on them.44 The names of 
persons whom the Committee approves are transmitted to the full 
Senate, where the Senate Majority Leader schedules floor votes on 
nominees, who must secure a majority for confirmation.45 
ii. Nomination and Confirmation 
The Miller Commission, a bipartisan group of distinguished 
attorneys who studied the selection process and issued a 1996 report,46 
determined that the appointments process has changed significantly 
from the process in the 1970s and has become increasingly 
complicated, factors that are reflected in growing reliance on larger 
staff who screen potential nominees.47 These alterations, which the 
group ascertained began in the Reagan Administration, have 
persisted during later presidencies.48 The Commission found that 
practices have changed in three basic ways: (1) more White House 
and Justice Department lawyers and resources are committed to 
screening possible judicial nominees; (2) extensive interviews with 
candidates are now routine; and (3) White House officials participate 
more in the process.49 The Commission also described the three 
questionnaires completed by nominees for the Justice Department, 
the Judiciary Committee, and the ABA as illustrative of the 
bureaucratization of the process, and the Commission discovered that 
many queries are repetitive or overlap and efforts to complete the 
questionnaires are "burdensome."50 
The Committee on Federal Courts of the New York City Bar 
("City Bar") performed an analysis reaching similar conclusions 
fifteen years ago. It detected substantial White House delay in 
44. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 63-69; The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, 
supra note 14, at 375. 
45. See, e.g., MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-6; Tobias, supra note 11, at 533. 
46. The membership of the bi-partisan commission included present and past federal 
appellate and district court judges, former White House Counsels who served Republican 
and Democratic presidents, prior Justice Department officials, former United States 
Senators, a prominent attorney, and a law professor. MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 
2. 
47. Id. at4. 
48. Id. 
49. See id. at 4-5. 
50. See id. at 6. Judiciary Committee nominee vetting and hearings have also delayed 
selection because the Committee may lack resources for investigations and may have 
difficulty scheduling hearings, which the entity does even for non-controversial nominees. 
The Senate leadership's inability to schedule prompt floor debates and votes on nominees 
whom the Committee has approved may also cause delay. See id. at 5; The Problem of 
Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 375-76. For more analysis of confirmations, see 
Tobias, supra note 11, at 535-36; infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text. 
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proposing candidates and an "inevitable lapse of time" in the 
nomination process,s1 while selection did not receive high priority at 
the FBI inquiry and Judiciary Committee hearing phases, which 
required several months.s2 The group also stated that the over-
committed judiciary could expect little relief, unless those 
participating in appointments dramatically changed their priorities, 
even as it recognized that a sense of greater urgency by all involved 
might significantly expedite selection.s3 Another important study 
found that executive and legislative branch officials evince insufficient 
appreciation of the vacancies problem's critical nature to institute 
actions that will facilitate selection.s4 
Numerous observers have astutely suggested to those associated 
with nominations and confirmations that they must strike the proper 
balance between the need for efficiency and for careful nominee 
evaluation. For example, the City Bar recommended the elimination 
of unnecessary delay and efforts to facilitate selection, but it warned 
against "hurried, assembly-line appointments" of people ill-suited to 
be federal judges for life-tenured, important positions.ss The 
researchers who conducted a 1994 FJC study at the Long Range 
Planning Committee's request, similarly cautioned that an expedited 
selection process should not be instituted at the expense of a 
comprehensive review of the abilities and character of potential 
jurists.s6 The National Commission on Judicial Discipline observed 
that considered vetting of candidates to guarantee the selection of 
only the most well-qualified and honest judges might minimize the 
possibility of subsequent judicial misconduct and suggested that FBI 
investigations be thorough.57 Most participants, especially the Senate, 
now accord nominees even more detailed review, although the proper 
amount of scrutiny is controversial and remains unclear.58 
51. See The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 376. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 375. 
54. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 347. 
55. See The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 377. 
56. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 347; see also MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, 
at 11 (suggesting that the judiciary's quality is much more important than the time which 
must be devoted to appointments). 
57. See NAT'L COMM'N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 81 (1993). 
58. Compare Bruce Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 672, 673, 687 {1989) (urging less scrutiny), with Melone, supra note 15, at 69 (urging 
greater scrutiny). For more discussion of the proper level of scrutiny see GERHARDT, 
supra note 15, at 135-79; Hartley & Holmes, supra note 36. 
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It is important, as well, to appreciate that nomination and 
confirmation are intertwined, so that the failure of certain 
participants to satisfy temporal deadlines can seriously affect others 
involved and exacerbate delay.59 For instance, the simultaneous 
submission of numerous nominees may postpone completion of FBI 
background investigations or ABA qualification ratings which could 
correspondingly slow the confirmation process.60 
iii. Limited Prospects For Meaningful Change 
A few analyses have determined that considerable delay in 
selection is inherent and defies reduction, although some delay may 
be rectified or ameliorated. During 1961, the ABA found an 
irreducible element of intrinsic delay stating, for example, that three 
months was the shortest practicable time to complete the nomination 
phase under ideal circumstances and the average had previously been 
more than double that.61 In 1987, the City Bar seriously doubted that 
the average period from vacancy to confirmation could ever be less 
than eight months, even with the best of intentions and additional 
effort, and proclaimed that achieving this temporal goal would not 
resolve the persistent conundrum.62 The entity voiced little optimism 
about finding very efficacious solutions.63 Those who prepared the 
1994 FJC report remarked that numerous measures, which might 
remedy the permanent difficulty by enhancing efficiency and 
resources, could minimally improve appointments,64 although these 
techniques only partly treat some reasons for delay and merely limit 
other causes, such as politics. Thus, conflicts among powerful 
59. Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 335 (noting the impact of delay on other elements 
of the selection process). 
60. Id. For more discussion of the FBI and ABA roles, see supra notes 40-41, 43 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
61. See 86 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS'N 503, 507 (1961). 
62. See The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 377. 
63. For example, the Committee on Federal Courts discovered no single point of 
delay in the multi-faceted selection process, which if corrected, would substantially 
remedy the problem. Id. at 378. Indeed, the Committee found quite the opposite with 
respect to different candidates, delay occurs at different stages. Id. at 376. Although the 
Committee considered it important that unnecessary delays in the appointment system be 
eliminated, it saw no practical way in which the average time lag of ten months or more 
between vacancy and candidate clearance is likely to be improved appreciably in the 
foreseeable future. Id. at 377. "But when all is said and done, the process simply cannot 
be streamlined to a point that the problem of persistent vacancies will be eliminated." Id. 
at378. 
64. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 344 (observing that vacancies may well occur 
more rapidly than they can be filled, regardless of measures adopted to expedite the 
appointment process). 
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interests will continue to slow the process, unless some form of merit 
selection that reduces the importance of politics is instituted.65 
The longstanding conundrum has persisted since the 1970s 
without change, despite concerted efforts of judges and attorneys to 
assess and publicize the difficulty as well as to request that the 
political branches address it.66 Illustrative are monthly compilations 
of all vacancies and of specific openings that comprise judicial 
emergencies, which the Judicial Conference broadly distributes. 
Moreover, Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist and 
many additional jurists have aggressively attempted to prevent delay, 
and the organized bar has frequently pursued the issue.67 
iv. Effects of the Persistent Vacancies Problem 
The permanent vacancies dilemma has imposed numerous 
disadvantages. One analysis ascertained that openings can 
significantly limit the courts' ability to resolve their filings, 
particularly given the relatively few judges throughout the United 
States and the small number in some individual courts.68 The empty 
seats and increased cases have placed unnecessary pressure on sitting 
judges and posed complications for litigants and counsel who are 
competing for scarce court resources.69 The FJC study determined 
that openings had a statistically significant effect on average judicial 
workloads for the time spanning 1970 through 1992.70 If the courts 
had been functioning with complete staff, workloads of appeals and 
district judges would have declined nine and ten percent, 
respectively.71 In fact, since the 1990s, the federal judiciary has 
experienced a backlog of approximately 250,000 civil suits, while 
criminal caseloads have essentially precluded a number of district 
judges from trying any civil matters in a particular year.72 
65. This possibility seems unlikely. See id.; see also The Problem of Judicial 
Vacancies, supra note 14, at 375-77. 
66. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 539 (citing recommendations by an ABA 
commission to fill judicial vacancies); The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 
378 (observing that judges have spoken out on the issue and that the Judicial Conference 
has published vacancies lists). 
67. See THE THIRD BRANCH, Aug. 1997, at 6; Ruth Hochberger, 3 Bar Presidents Hit 
Delay In Filling U.S. Court Seats, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 24, 1981, at 1. For decades the bench and 
bar have urged expedition, but the response time has only modestly improved. The 
Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 375. 
68. See The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 374. 
69. Id. 
70. Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 327. 
71. Id. 
72. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 540. 
2014 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
The Miller Commission expressed concern that the cumbersome, 
protracted process detrimentally affects the federal justice system and 
potential appointees, suggesting that the federal judiciary's quality 
could decrease.73 During 1987, the City Bar warned lawmakers that 
the disadvantages imposed by continued inaction must be balanced 
with the frustration of justice produced by undue delay and the 
substantial price in popular respect that the highly visible bench pays 
when judges cannot discharge their constitutionally-assigned duties in 
a timely and efficient manner.74 Leaving this recurrent problem 
unaddressed might undermine the regard that citizens have for 
Congress and the President. 
2. The Current Impasse 
Political considerations seem to have greater significance for the 
current problem than the persistent one, although politics pervade 
both, thus obfuscating their relationship. Political factors drive the 
existing dilemma and share much responsibility with the persistent 
problem for recent Fourth Circuit selection. Temporal proximity 
frustrates appreciation of how the present difficulty developed. 
This subsection attempts to proffer an accurate account of the 
current impasse through the conduct and observations of people and 
entities actively involved in the process. The Essay emphasizes the 
second Clinton Administration, particularly its first year, as well as 
the initial year of the George W. Bush Administration, because 
selection in 1997 and 2001 was relatively similar and rather recent. 
The focus chosen is appropriate, even though the existing problem 
apparently originated earlier, perhaps with the 1987 Senate rejection 
of Judge Bork. 
Numerous political phenomena, which attended appointments 
throughout the last decade and a half, contributed significantly to the 
present dilemma, although certain aspects of the generic difficulty did 
implicate selection in 1997 and 2001. Each President and the Senate 
were primarily responsible for most of the phenomena that constitute 
the current problem. These public officials could have rectified or 
ameliorated many of the complications, if they had the political will. 
The periods that the Clinton and Bush Administrations and the 
respective Senates needed for completing nomination and 
confirmation were substantial in 1997 and 2001. For example, during 
1997, nominations on average required more than 600 days, while 
73. See MILLER REPORT, supra note 11, at 6. 
74. See The Problem of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 14, at 383. 
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confirmations consumed a record high 183 days.75 Most of the delay 
in judicial selection continued to occur between the date of vacancy 
and nomination. 
a. Nomination Process 
The failure to confirm more judges in 1997 and 2001 can be 
ascribed partly to delay in tendering nominees and the delay of 
particular Senators or additional political officials who suggested 
individuals for the President to consider.76 Nevertheless, during 1997, 
other participants, including Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), then 
chair of the Judiciary Committee; Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.), then 
Senate Majority Leader; and specific Republican Senators, slowed the 
process somewhat because of concerns about phenomena, such as 
"judicial activism."77 During 2001, their counterparts, Senators Leahy 
(D-Vt.) and Daschle (D-S.D.), may have similarly contributed to 
delay out of concerns regarding the political views of certain Bush 
nominees.78 
Both Presidents apparently had some responsibility for the 
rather few judicial appointments that resulted from delays in 
submitting nominees. For example, on January 7, 1997, President 
Clinton provided the names of twenty-two lawyers, a number of 
whom he had nominated during the prior Congress and certain of 
whom had secured confirmation hearings or favorable committee 
votes, while President Bush only proffered bis first group of nominees 
in May 2001.79 Thereafter, the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
gradually, but steadily and rather promptly, forwarded more names. 
Illustrative was Clinton's submission of thirteen individuals for 
district court seats immediately before the August recess on July 31, 
75. See Viveca Novak, Empty-Bench Syndrome, TIME, May 26, 1997, at 37; see also 
Orrin G. Hatch, There's No Vacancy Crisis in the Federal Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 
1997, at A15 (claiming confirmation required ninety-one days and nominations required 
618 days); Editorial, Clearing the Bench: Federal Court Vacancies are Delaying Justice, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 17, 1997, at 16A (reciting similar statistics); supra note 32 
and accompanying tei..'t (affording comparable data for 1980-1995). 
76. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 11, at 541; Savage, supra note 1. 
77. See, e.g., Judicial Activism: Assessing the Impact: Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcomm on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, 105th Cong. 
(1997), 143 CONG. REC. S2515 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
78. See, e.g., Groner, supra note 2; Savage, supra note 1. 
79. See U.S Newswire, President Clinton Nominates 22 to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 
1997), 1997 WL 5710163; PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ANNOUNCING NOMINATIONS FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (May 9, 2001) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT'S REMARKS]. 
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1997.80 Most of the nominees of each President appeared to possess 
fine professional qualifications, and some had prior experience in the 
federal or state court judiciaries.81 A number of the nominees had 
seemingly moderate political perspectives, a few were affiliated with 
the party not occupying the White House, and the predecessors of 
both Presidents had appointed some to the district bench.82 
The Presidents' propensity to forward large batches of people on 
the eve of Senate recesses and their general handling of the 
nomination process exemplified several problems.83 When the 
Presidents provided numerous candidates at one time, particularly as 
the Senate was about to recess, this complicated Judiciary Committee 
efforts to facilitate confirmation. Clinton had tendered a mere eight 
new nominees by June 1997, while Senator Hatch considered 
unacceptable most people included in the January set, thus permitting 
him to allege that there were not enough people for efficient 
Committee processing.84 
Neither President forwarded nominees for all available 
vacancies, which would have enabled them to pressure the Judiciary 
Committee and the Senate, although each could have claimed that 
there was no reason to provide greater numbers of nominees than the 
respective committee chairs had indicated the panel would review.85 
In fact, in much of 1997 and some of 2001, the administrations placed 
80. See U.S. Newswire, President Clinton Nominates Thirteen to the Federal Bench 
(July 31, 1997), 1997 WL 5714533. Bush submitted similarly substantial groups before 
2001 Senate recesses. See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Bush Nominates 18 to Federal Bench, 
AM. LAW. MEDIA, Aug. 3, 2001, http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchive.jsp?type=Article& 
oldid=ZZZGlCZBYPC (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
81. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 79; see also Carl Tobias, Filling the 
Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REV. 309, 315 (1996); Sheldon Goldman & 
Elliot Slotnick, Clinton's First Term Judiciary: Many Bridges to Cross, 80 JUDICATURE 
254 (1997). See generally 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). 
82. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81; Savage, supra note 4. 
83. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 541-42. 
84. See Hatch, supra note 75; see also Neil A. Lewis, Keeping Track: Vacant Federal 
Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A12. Analogous are President Bush's 
submission of relatively few new nominees by June 2001 and Senator Leahy's apparently 
considering unacceptable some nominees in the May package. See, e.g., Tobias, supra 
note 38, at 107; Groner, supra note 2. 
85. In 1997, Senator Hatch held one hearing each month the Senate was in session for 
one appeals and four or five district court nominees. See infra note 93. President Bush 
has accused Senate Democrats of failing to hold hearings for his nominees, but Senator 
Leahy has stated that the confirmation pace in 2001 "exceeded the pace of confirmations 
in President Clinton's first year." Neil A. Le\vis, Bush and Democrats in Senate Trade 
Blame for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9. 
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before the committee more nominees than the chairs had suggested 
they would review.86 Finally, both Clinton and Bush had to balance 
the necessity for speed with cautious analysis of designees' abilities 
and political viability because nominees who were controversial or, 
worse, lacked competence or honesty, could have undermined 
administration credibility and might have delayed, stopped, or 
harmed the process. 
Senate members and politicians from the locales where openings 
occurred, who were to suggest people for the Presidents' 
consideration, apparently contributed to slowed submission for many 
vacancies in 1997 and 2001. For instance, in some states with no 
Senators of the President's party, identifying those political figures 
who were to make the recommendations was difficult. Addressing 
Senators' insistence on participating also delayed the process. For 
example, during Clinton's administration, Republican Senators from 
Arizona and Washington demanded that they be involved in 
candidate selection and even be allowed to tender suggestions.87 
Insofar as the administrations might have better encouraged 
Senate members or additional politicians to expedite their proposals 
to the President, Executive Branch personnel may have done too 
little or been stymied by the "start-up" costs of establishing a 
presidency.88 For instance, the second Clinton Administration spent 
considerable time in 1997 replacing the Deputy and Associate 
Attorneys General as well as the White House Counsel, while 
ongoing Whitewater investigations and numerous additional matters 
could have deflected the attention of many attorneys in both offices.89 
The nascent Bush Administration experienced similar difficulties, 
such as securing prompt confirmation of certain high-level Justice 
86. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 542. 
87. See Peter Callaghan, Senators Agree on Selecting Judges, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma), 
Aug. 12, 1997, at Bl, http://www.tribnet.com/archives (last visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review), available at 1997 WL 3458401; Neil A. Lewis, 
Clinton Has a Chance to Shape the Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1997, at A30; see also 143 
CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (asserting 
that Republican Senators may have so intimated). 
88. Helen Dewar, Confirmation Process Frustrates President; Clinton Wants Senate 
GOP to Pick Up Pace, WASH. POST, July 25, 1997, at A21; Greg Pierce, Clinton vs. 
Clinton, \V ASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1997, at A6, http://www.washtimes.com/archives.htm (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at 1997 WL 
3680583; see also Savage, supra note 82. 
89. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 543-44; see also President's Counsel Quits, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1996, at B22. 
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Department officials, which may have distracted judicial recruiters 
from selection.90 
In short, Presidents Clinton and Bush discharged their 
responsibilities for the nomination of judicial candidates in analogous 
ways during 1997 and 2001. To be sure, certain procedures that each 
President deployed are distinguishable, but these are differences of 
degree rather than kind. Both administrations might also have 
ameliorated some difficulties they encountered, particularly by 
capitalizing on lessons derived from prior efforts, although a number 
of complications may be inherent in the process. 
b. ABA Committee 
During the 104th Congress, the ABA Committee continued to 
rank candidates' qualifications as the entity had been doing since the 
1950s. Senator Hatch voiced increasing concern about this 
involvement and, in February 1997, the chair ended formal ABA 
participation.91 During March 2001, the Bush Administration notified 
the American Bar Association that it would not solicit its advice prior 
to submitting nominations.92 
90. See, e.g., Audrey Hudson, Senate Panel Ends Wrangling, Approves 3 Key Justice 
Posts, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A4, http://www.washtimes.com/archives.htm (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at 2001 WL 
4152968; Alison Mitchell, Senate Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58-42, Closing a 
Five Week Battle, N.Y. T!MES, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al. But see 147 CONG. REC. S8552 (daily 
ed. Aug. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (praising the Judiciary Committee's 
expeditious consideration of Bush nominees). See generally Jeffrey Toobin, Ashcroft's 
Ascent, NEW YORKER, Apr. 15, 2002, at 50 (assessing Attorney General Ashcroft and the 
Justice Department). 
91. See Terry Carter, A Conservative Juggernaut, A.B.A. J. (June 1997), at 32; see also 
supra note 43 and accompanying text (assessing the ABA's role). But see N. Lee Cooper, 
Standing Up to Critical Scrutiny, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1997), at 6 (identifying the important role 
of the committee in the nominee evaluation process). 
92. See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, White House Counsel, to Martha Barnett, 
ABA President (Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also 
Laura Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Federal Judicial Candidates, 10 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 37, 37 (2002). Democrats' insistence on ABA input led to more delay. 
Because the ABA long played a greater role in helping Presidents ascertain whether to 
proceed with designees, it may have future influence, but this is unclear. See Hearings on 
Judicial Nominations Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) 
[hereinafter Hearings on Judicial Nominations] (statement of Sen. Leahy), at 
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/member_statement.cfm?id=l81&wit_id=50 (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("[T]he White House last 
year unilaterally changed the practice of nine Republican and Democratic Presidents and 
will no longer allow the ABA to begin its peer reviews during the selection process .... "). 
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c. Confirmation Process 
In 1997 and 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee bore some 
responsibility for delay principally through its inability to investigate, 
hold hearings for, and vote on more nominees. For instance, Senator 
Hatch ordinarily conducted a hearing at which one appeals court and 
four or five district court nominees appeared every month of the 
105th Congress's first session.93 However, the committee did not 
meticulously do so, and the Senate had approved a mere nine judges 
by early September.94 Moreover, the Bush Administration and other 
observers criticized the Senate for holding too few hearings, 
especially involving appellate court seats, and for confirming only 
twenty-eight judges in 2001, although the committee seemed to 
process individuals more expeditiously and had afforded every district 
court nominee a hearing by spring 2002.95 
The dearth of 1997 appointments seemed attributable partly to 
deficient Judiciary Committee resources and to politics. For example, 
Senator Hatch resolved the perennial dispute over the ABA, while 
Republican Senators debated the roles of the committee, its chair, 
and particular members, and chose to preserve the status quo.96 
These controversies required resources that could have expedited 
confirmation.97 The rather few appointments in 2001 similarly might 
have resulted from committee devotion of insufficient resources and 
partially from politics.98 Nevertheless, Senator Leahy instituted 
93. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 545. This was the practice he followed in the 104th 
Congress. See Al Kamen, Window Closing on Judicial Openings, WASH. POST, June 12, 
1995, at A17 (stating that the Republican-controlled committee confirmed one appellate 
and three or four district court judges a month). 
94. See Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744-45 (1997). Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), committee 
chair from 1987 until 1994, claimed in March 1997 that two hearings occurred each month 
during his tenure. 143 CONG. REC. S2539 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997). 
95. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 85; Neil A. Lewis, Democrats are Pushed on Judicial 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22; Savage, supra note 1. The most 
controversial dispute involved Judiciary Committee rejection of Judge Charles Pickering 
on a 10-9 party-line vote after contentious hearings and debate. See Albert R. Hunt, The 
Politics of Lifetime Appointments, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2002, at A19; Neil A. Lewis, First 
Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.17, 2002, at A35. A similar 
dispute occurred over Judge Brooks Smith, but he eventually secured a 12-7 vote and 
confirmation on July 31, 2002. See Neil A. Lewis, Panel Approves Bush Appeals Court 
Pick, N. Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at A19. 
96. See Neil A. Lewis, Move to Limit Clinton's Judicial Choices Fails, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1997, at D22; Obstruction of Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1997, at 9; see also 
supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
97. The Committee processed few nominees while resolving those disputes. See 
Tobias, supra note 11, at 545. 
98. Hearings on Judicial Nominations, supra note 92 (statement of Sen. Leahy), at 
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special efforts to speed the process, such as conducting hearings in the 
August recess.99 Insofar as specific Democratic Senators slowed 
confirmation, they might have been "paying back" Republicans for 
their perceived delay when considering Clinton nominees.100 
Moreover, the May decision of Senator James Jeffords (R-Vt.) to 
become an independent meant that the Senate only reached an 
organizational agreement in July, which significantly postponed the 
process's commencement and smooth operation.101 
In fairness, individuals who enjoy life tenure and exercise the 
state's enormous power require careful scrutiny to guarantee that 
they are qualified. While striking the proper balance between close 
analysis and expedition is difficult, Senator Hatch argued that he 
preferred to fulfill that obligation with much care, and caution may 
have contributed less than politics to slowed confirmation.102 
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/member_ statement.cfm?id=181&wit_id=50 (last visited 
Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); id. (statement of Sen. 
Hatch), at http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/member_statement.cfm?id=204&wit_id=51 
(last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Symposium, 
The Judicial Appointments Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 1-176 (2001); 
Jonathan Ringel, Picking Judges: The Art of the Deal, THE RECORDER, Apr. 30, 2001, at 
1, 04/30/2001 Recorder (San Francisco, CA.) 1; Ringel, supra note 80; William Safire, 
Battle of the Blue Slips, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A33. 
99. See Hearings on Judicial Nominations, supra note 92 (statement of Sen. Leahy), at 
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/oldsite/pjl082201f.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file 
with the North Carolina Law Review); id. (statement of Sen. Leahy), at http://www.senate. 
gov/-judiciary/oldsite/pjl082701f.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North 
Carolina Law Review); see also Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial 
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22. 
100. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Aid Bill is Stalled By Bid to Force Votes on Judge, WALL ST. 
J., Oct.17, 2001, at A16; Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL 
ST. J., May 9, 2001, at A26; Hunt, supra note 95; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash in 
Capitol Over Pace of Filling Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002 at A33. 
101. See David Rogers, Sen. Jeffords Defects From GOP Creating Era of 
'Tripartisanship', WALL ST. J., May 25, 2001, at A16; Editorial, True Bipartisanship, WALL 
ST. J., May 31, 2001, at A16. The Presidents were also responsible for the few 
confirmations because, in early 1997 and 2001, each tendered few names, some of whom 
the chair or his colleagues seemed to find unacceptable, and provided others irregularly, 
thus complicating processing. However, Hatch's claim that he had too few nominees to 
consider lacked persuasiveness because equal delay resulted from the few hearings for, 
and votes on, nominees and specific Senators' opposition. Similarly, by the conclusion of 
2001, Bush had furnished enough nominees, but that date may have been too late. See 
supra notes 79, 85-90 and accompanying text. 
102. Hatch faced conflicts in Senate traditions and his obligations to Republican 
colleagues, who were concerned about activist judges, and he did resist the challenge to 
Senate conventions. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Neil A. Lewis, 
Republicans Seek Greater Influence in Naming Judges, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 1997, at 1 
(describing how Senator Hatch became embroiled in the appointments controversy). He 
also processed some nominees, even castigating his GOP colleagues for opposing them, 
and the 1997 record resembled some in prior comparable periods. See, e.g., 143 CONG. 
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Senator Lott and the Republican leadership seemed to have 
greater responsibility for delay during 1997. The chamber had 
confirmed only nine judges by September 1997, although the 
Judiciary Committee had approved and sent to the floor significantly 
more people.103 Some delay in placing nominees with favorable 
committee votes on the Senate calendar and according them floor 
debates and votes was understandable, given the press of other 
significant business and the chamber's unanimous consent 
procedure.104 
However, the few judges confirmed in 1997, especially as 
contrasted with prior sessions, indicate that much responsibility lay 
with the Senate majority's leadership and its scheduling of floor votes. 
As the 105th Congress commenced, Lott promised to assess closely 
Clinton's nominees.105 In spring 1997, Senator Leahy, the Judiciary 
Committee's ranking minority member, and other Democrats 
apparently responded by informing the Senate that they had 
expedited appointments in Republican administrations and by urging 
floor debate and votes on nominees.106 
d. Nomination and Confirmation 
Numerous difficulties related to nomination and confirmation 
evaluated in the prior discussion of the persistent dilemma 
accompanied selection during 1997 and 2001.107 For example, some 
administration and Senate personnel involved with the process 
seemed to not comprehend the problem's severity, as witnessed in the 
REC. S2515, S2536 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also Ted Gest 
& Lewis Lord, The GO P's Judicial Freeze: A Fight to See Who Rules Over the Law, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1997, at 23 (discussing the battle over judicial 
appointments during the Clinton presidency); Novak, supra note 75, at 38 (detailing the 
major reasons why appointments have been delayed). 
103. This dynamic resembled Republican processing in the 1996 election year. See 143 
CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Hatch, 
supra note 75; see also Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81, at 257 (recounting 1996 
treatment); Tobias, supra note 94, at 744-45 (same). 
104. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 546. 
105. See Lewis, supra note 87. See generally Gest & Lord, supra note 102; Novak, 
supra note 75. 
106. For example, Senator Biden insisted that all nominees have floor votes, while 
Senator Sarbanes claimed the Republicans would not even afford up-or-down votes. See 
143 CONG. REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997). When Lott reportedly said he would 
move no nominations until Clinton filled four Federal Election Commission vacancies, 
Leahy discussed non-controversial nominees (those who had bipartisan support and 
unanimous committee votes) to courts under pressure. See 143 CONG. REC. S5653 (daily 
ed. June 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
107. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text. 
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uneven pace of nominations and of Committee scrutiny. Certain 
observers, especially Senators, claimed that the present complication 
and much delay were basically animated by politics and even by 
concerns regarding candidates' ideology. For instance, in 1997, 
Senators Biden and Sarbanes suggested that their Republican 
colleagues were politicizing the process and altering two centuries of 
tradition.108 
An effort which some observers found political and which 
seemingly implicated the existing impasse and delay was the endeavor 
of Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) to examine the allocation of 
judicial resources and their employment in the regional circuits.109 
For example, his subcommittee conducted hearings to determine 
whether the courts needed more judges or even required their present 
complements.11° Most relevant to this Essay, Chief Judge Wilkinson 
testified that the Fourth Circuit functions effectively with fewer than 
all of the positions authorized,111 while Grassley issued a report that 
echoed Wilkinson's idea and found that virtually no court needed 
additional judges.112 
The appropriate use of judicial resources is a valid Senate 
concern, but this initiative may have slowed selection for appeals 
courts, which have experienced high percentages of vacancies, many 
108. 143 CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997). Biden even stated on the 
Senate floor that the Republicans were attempting to prevent Clinton from appointing 
judges, especially for the appeals courts. Id. at S2538. Some experts offered similar ideas. 
Professor Sheldon Goldman said "'a newly-elected president has [never] faced this kind 
of challenge to his judicial nominations,' " while Professor Geoffrey Stone found the 
Republican actions " 'a scandalous and stunningly irresponsible misuse of the Senate's 
authority.' " See Gest & Lord, supra note 102 (quoting Professors Goldman and Stone). 
109. See U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT 
AND THE COURTS, CHAIRMAN'S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (Mar. 1999) (Sen. Grassley, 
Chair), available at http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/graphics/genera-2.pdf [hereinafter 
CHAIRMAN'S REPORT]; infra note 110. 
110. Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6. See generally Carl Tobias, The 
Federal Appeals Courts at Century's End, 34 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 549, 557-69 (2000) 
(assessing Fourth Circuit data compared to other regional circuits and judges' views on 
additional judgeships). 
111. See Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 12-18; see also Tobias, 
supra note 94, at 749-50 (discussing how many judges oppose expanding the size of the 
federal judiciary); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal 
Judiciary, 43 EMORY L. J. 1147 (1994). 
112. See CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 109. For a more detailed analysis of the 
Fourth Circuit specifically, see Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, in CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, 
supra note 109, § II(d), available at http://www.senate.gov/-grassley/graphics/fourth.pdf 
[hereinafter Analysis of the Fourth Circuit]. 
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judicial emergencies, and increasing caseloads.113 Moreover, 
Congress has authorized no new appellate judgeships since 1990, 
although the Judicial Conference suggested that lawmakers approve 
numerous additional seats, a proposal based on expert conservative 
judgments and systematically assembled empirical data related to 
appeals and workloads.114 
Rather similar developments attended selection in 2001. For 
instance, three of the eleven appeals court nominees proposed by 
Bush in May received Judiciary Committee hearings during that 
year.115 In fairness, Senator Leahy and other Democrats, such as 
Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), stated publicly that the Senate 
would expedite processing of nominees whom they considered highly 
competent and politically moderate.116 For example, the Senate did 
confirm Judge Gregory and Judge Barrington Parker, whom 
President Clinton had initially appointed.117 
Numerous actions of Senators whose party did not occupy the 
White House supported the claims that the existing conundrum and 
delays were politically motivated, especially out of concern about 
nominees' perceived ideological views. Illustrative has been the high 
percentage of appeals court vacancies, which Senate members view as 
more important than district courts, because appellate rulings govern 
multiple states and the shrunken Supreme Court docket means the 
regional circuits increasingly serve as courts of last resort for those 
areas.118 
113. Twenty-five judgeships were vacant. See Judicial Boxscore As of August 1, 1997, 
THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1997, at 
8. For relevant data on docket growth, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 58-64 (1996); LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 28, 
atlO. 
114. See Tobias, supra note 12, at 1271 (discussing Conference proposals); Tobias, 
supra note 94, at 753 (describing the proposals as conservative); see also S. 678, 105th 
Cong. (1997) (providing judgeships); 143 CONG REC. S2538-S2540 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 
1997) (statement of Sen. Biden) (claiming that the Conference documented needs to fill 
vacancies and to authorize more judges but Republicans urged the decommissioning of 
judgeships); Letter from Leonadis Ralph Mecham, Secretary, to Sen. Patrick Leahy (May 
28, 2002) (urging the creation of new judgeships) (on file \vith the North Carolina Law 
Review). 
115. See Jonathan Groner, Privilege Fight Looms Over Estrada, LEGAL TIMES, June 3, 
2002, at 1; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. But see infra note 117 and 
accompanying text (stating that the Senate confirmed only two of the nominees). 
116. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, First Punch in the Revived Bench-Tipping Brawl, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, at A35; Neil A. Lewis, More Battles Loom Over Bush's Nominees 
for Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at A24. 
117. See Mark Hamblett, Parker Brings Experience and Intellect to Circuit, N.Y. L.J., 
Oct. 25, 2001, at 1; Masters, supra note 3. 
118. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. 
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e. Prospects for Change 
To the extent that many political considerations attending 
selection in 1997 and 2001 and fostering the present difficulty are 
intrinsic, they may defy treatment. For instance, the analysis of 
permanent openings suggested approaches that enhanced efficiency 
and resources will minimally limit delay resulting from politics.119 
Nonetheless, the evaluation of political phenomena constituting the 
current dilemma indicates that public officers might rectify them if 
the officials had sufficient political will. For instance, political factors 
are all that appeared to prevent Presidents Clinton and Bush from 
promptly tendering more nominees with comparatively moderate 
political perspectives and a majority of Senators from expeditiously 
approving them. 
f. Effects of the Current Impasse 
The existing complication has had numerous deleterious impacts, 
many of which are analogous to those that the persistent vacancies 
problem imposed.120 For example, the present dilemma has pressured 
courts and parties, the effects of which are manifested in judges' 
workloads.121 The judiciary now experiences a large civil backlog,122 
and docket growth and openings in a third of the Ninth Circuit's 
positions required it to cancel 600 oral arguments during 1997 .123 In 
July 1997, the imminent crisis produced by extraordinary numbers of 
judicial vacancies and the difficulties that attend delayed 
appointments led the presidents of seven major legal associations to 
author an open letter urging President Clinton and Senator Lott to 
commit sufficient resources to expedite confirmation.124 These ideas 
er. REV. 403, 403-404 (1997); Lewis, supra note 96. 
119. See supra notes 64--65 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
121. See Tobias, supra note 11, at 550-51; Gest & Lord, supra note 102, at 24. 
122. See Gest & Lord, supra note 102, at 23-24; see also Robert Schmidt, The Costs of 
Judicial Delay, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 28, 1997, at 6 (discussing the District of Columbia's 
judicial backlog); Bill Kisliuk, Judges' Conference Slams Circuit-Splitting, Vacancies, THE 
RECORDER, Aug. 19, 1997, at 1, LEXIS, News & Business Library, News, U.S. News File 
(arguing that judicial vacancies created the backlog). 
123. See Novak, supra note 75, at 37; Chronic Federal Judge Shortage Puts Lives, 
Justice On Hold, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at 9A, LEXIS, News & Business 
Library, News, U.S. News File (stating that Sixth Circuit canceled sixty arguments). 
During 1997, Senator Leahy claimed that a significant number of federal prosecutors had 
to forgo cases or enter plea bargains because there were insufficient judges to hear cases. 
See 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8045 (daily ed. July 24, 1997). 
124. Letter to William J. Clinton, President of the United States, & Trent Lott, 
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, from N. Lee Cooper, ABA President, et al. (July 14, 1997), 
2002] JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 2025 
evidence how openings detrimentally affect millions of individuals. 
Insofar as the public ascribes the current impasse to partisan politics, 
the activity can undermine respect for the government, particularly 
the President and the Senate. 
C. Fourth Circuit Developments 
The origins and growth of the considerations that have fostered 
controversy over Fourth Circuit judicial selection resemble in certain, 
and differ in other, ways from the national developments detailed 
above. The background related to the Fourth Circuit also has deep 
historical roots and is rather complicated. For instance, Senator 
Helms has trenchantly admonished that no Republican appointee 
from North Carolina has served on the appellate court since President 
Calvin Coolidge named Judge John J. Parker.125 
Several factors suggest that the persistent vacancies conundrum 
had somewhat limited relevance for the Fourth Circuit until quite 
recently. These considerations include the comparatively few appeals 
which litigants and attorneys took to the court, the rather small 
number of active appellate judgeships -that Congress authorized for 
the Fourth Circuit, and the relative infrequency with which openings 
arose on the court. For example, in the 1970s, the Fourth Circuit, like 
numerous appeals courts, continued to receive a manageable quantity 
of filings-minuscule percentages of which were complex126-to 
accord most cases appellate justice,127 to operate with few active 
judges (seven),128 and to experience only occasional vacancies that 
Presidents and the Senate could expeditiously fill.129 
reprinted in 143 CONG. REC. at S8046. The bar association presidents warned that large 
numbers of judicial vacancies and delays in judicial confirmation were eroding democracy. 
125. See Firestone, supra note 1; see also David Savage, Clinton Losing Fight for Black 
Judge: His Nominees to All-White 4th Circuit are Blocked by Sen. Helms, L.A. TIMES, July 
7, 2000, at Al (discussing recent Court of Appeals nominations). 
126. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 327-28; supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS 
OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 14-30 (1994) (discussing the design and tradition of 
federal appellate courts as well as the concept of appellate justice); JUDITH MCKENNA, 
STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 9-
11 (1993) (explaining the process of the Court of Appeals and the concept of appellate 
justice). 
128. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-32 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (increasing the number of active circuit judgeships in 
the Fourth Circuit to seven); Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 323-24; supra notes 24 and 
accompanying text. 
129. See Bermant et al., supra note 11, at 329-31; supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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Beginning in the late 1970s, the Fourth Circuit began 
encountering significant docket growth and its membership increased 
to ten when the omnibus judgeships statute passed.130 Even rising 
caseloads and the corresponding expansion of the court's complement 
seemed to have little impact on selection during much of the 1980s. 
For instance, Congress authorized a single new judgeship,131 while 
President Ronald Reagan and Senators smoothly filled those few 
openings that occurred, so that the court had no vacancies at his 
administration's conclusion.132 In short, the persistent vacancies 
problem seemed to have little historical relevance for the Fourth 
Circuit, although it may have affected appointments during the 1990s. 
In contrast, the present impasse apparently has much salience. A 
1990 Act enlarged the court to fifteen judges.133 A number of circuit 
seats opened in the George Bush Administration, which realized 
considerable success in appointing judges before 1992 but 
experienced some difficulty filling the positions during that election 
year.134 Democrats, who controlled the Senate, attributed the 
complications to delayed nomination of candidates they found 
acceptable, while the Republican Party claimed that the majority 
slowed the processing of well-qualified candidates because they 
hoped a Democrat would capture the White House in 1992.135 In any 
event, when Bush left office, the Fourth Circuit had several vacancies, 
for one of which he had nominated Judge Boyle.136 
130. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629-32 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)). See generally WILLIAM MCLAUGHLAN, FEDERAL 
COURT CASELOADS (1984) (analyzing docket growth). 
131. See Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 346 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)). 
132. See GOLDMAN, supra note 39, at 285-345 (assessing Reagan's judicial selection). 
133. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 202, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5098-99 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000)) (adding four judgeships to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit). See generally Sheldon 
Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282 (1993) 
[hereinafter Goldman, Final] (assessing the Judgeship Act and Bush's judicial selection 
legacy); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 
JUDICATURE 294 (1991) [hereinafter Goldman, Imprint] (assessing Bush's judicial 
selection). 
134. Bush nominated, and the Senate confirmed, three judges in 1990 and 1991. For an 
analysis of Bush's judicial selection, see Goldman, Final, supra note 133; Goldman, 
Imprint, supra note 133. 
135. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Biden); Goldman, Final, supra note 133; see also Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial 
Selection, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1257, 1270-74 (assessing Bush's judicial selection). 
136. See, e.g., Firestone, supra note 1; Brooke A. Masters, For One Nominee Fight 
Ahead, WASH. POST, May 18, 2001, at A29; Monk, supra note 1. 
2002] JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 2027 
President Clinton enjoyed marginally greater success. During 
1995, the President first attempted to elevate James A. Beaty, Jr., 
whom he had named a United States District Judge for the Middle 
District of North Carolina two years earlier, but Senator Helms and 
Senator Hatch blocked Beaty's consideration.137 In 1999, Clinton 
nominated James Wynn, who serves as a judge on the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals, and the jurist received similar Senate treatment.138 
Helms premised his actions on the claim that the Fourth Circuit was 
operating well without its full judicial complement.139 During 
October 2000, the President nominated Professor Elizabeth Gibson 
of the University of North Carolina School of Law140 and Andre 
Davis, a United States District Judge for the District of Maryland;141 
however, the chamber processed neither person. 
Clinton did appoint Fourth Circuit Judges Blane Michael and 
Robert King from West Virginia, whose rather smooth confirmations 
may reflect their non-controversial candidacies or the political 
acumen of longtime Democratic Senator Robert Byrd.142 The 
President also named Diana Gribbon Motz, who had served on the 
Maryland Court of Appeals, as the first Fourth Circuit female judge 
from Maryland, while he elevated William B. Traxler, Jr., whom Bush 
placed on the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina.143 Finally, Clinton's Article II recess appointment of Roger 
137. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 187-88; Monk, supra note 136; Charles 
Ogletree, Why Has the G.O.P. Kept Blacks Off Federal Courts?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2000, at A25; Savage, supra note 125; see also Editorial, Confirm Judge Beaty, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 8, 1996, at 14A. 
138. See, e.g., Firestone, supra note 1; Masters, supra note 136; see also Editorial, 
Filling Out the Court, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 14, 1999, at A28. 
139. See Ogletree, supra note 137; James Rosen, Edwards Backs Wynn for 4th Circuit 
Judgeship, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 5, 1999, at A3; Savage, supra note 
125; see also Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6 (providing the testinlony of 
Fourth Circuit Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson who proffered a similar assertion). 
140. See U.S. Newswire, President Clinton Nominates S. Elizabeth Gibson to the 
Federal Bench (Oct. 26, 2000), 2000 WL 26850371; Anne Blythe, Appeals Court Nominee 
Realistic, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 28, 2000, at 1B (Orange Co. Ed.). 
141. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton's Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 
JUDICATURE 228, 248 (2001); Lyle Denniston, Politics, Race Cloud Naming of Judges to 
U.S. 4th Circuit, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 8, 2001, at lA; Maria Glod, New U.S. Judge's 
Future Uncertain, WASH. POST, Jan 19, 2001, at BS. 
142. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Adding Diversity to the Bench, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 27, 
1993. at 7; Francis X. Clines, How Do West Virginians Spell Pork? It's B-Y-R-D, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2002, at Al; Lawrence Messina, "Tenacious" Judge Takes Seat Today, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W.Va.), Oct. 23, 1998, at lA, 1998 WL 5977846. 
143. See, e.g., Marcia Myers, Diana Motz Joins Federal Bench Today, BALTIMORE 
SUN, July 22, 1994, at lB; see also Clinton Picks Motz for U.S. Appeals Court, BALTIMORE 
SUN, Jan. 28, 1994, at 2B; Traxler Nominated to 4th Circuit Court, CHARLESTON POST & 
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Gregory partly led President George W. Bush to nominate, and the 
Senate to confirm, Gregory in July 2001.144 Despite these efforts, 
when Clinton completed his second term, the fifteen-member court 
technically had five empty seats, one of which Gregory ultimately 
filled. 
The significant number of vacancies now experienced by the 
Fourth Circuit, and the considerable time that they have remained 
open, has apparently limited its delivery of appellate justice in several 
ways. For example, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, which recently conducted a one-year 
study at the behest of Congress, ascertained that the Fourth Circuit 
affords the smallest percentage of published opinions in the country 
and its percentage of oral arguments ties for the lowest.145 The court's 
eleven percent figure for published determinations is twelve points 
under the system-wide average.146 Its thirty percent statistic for oral 
arguments is ten points below the national average and less than one-
half the percentage granted in the First and Second Circuits.147 The 
relatively few published dispositions and oral arguments are useful 
measures of appellate justice and effective performance, which 
involve significant process values, such as open court access. Opinion 
publication and oral argument can enhance judicial accountability, 
visibility, and fairness to litigants.148 
The Fourth Circuit operates efficaciously in other ways. For 
instance, the Commission found that the court attains the systemic 
average for most resolution time indicators and for merits 
terminations per judgeship.149 Chief Judge Wilkinson testified 
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), July 11, 1998, at B6, http://www.charleston.neUPSUser/ 
psrecord.htm?NS_doc_offset=O&NS_doc_returned=l&NS_adv_search=O&NS_search_set 
=dkgOxCuyv65afOe80a8530d&NS_template_dir=/docs/templates/archives&NS_initial_frm 
=1 (last visited Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
144. See Masters, supra note 3; Mitchell, supra note 3. 
145. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at22 tbls.2-6 & 2-7. 
146. See id. at 22 tbl.2-7 (providing the data on published opinions and oral 
arguments). But see Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1 (finding that the 
court operates well). 
147. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 22 tbl.2-6. But see Hearing Before the Senate 
Judiciary, supra note 6 at 12-18 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson) (asserting that the 
court operates well). 
148. See BAKER, supra note 127, at 14-30; MCKENNA, supra note 127, at 9-11. See 
generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987) 
(assessing process values). 
149. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS, 93 tbl.l; 95 tbl.7. The Senate report found its 
disposition rate the "fastest" and "by this important measure, [the court is] in excellent 
shape." Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 2. Accord Hearing Before the 
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correspondingly that the tribunal functions well without its full 
complement of authorized judges.150 Moreover, the 1999 report 
compiled by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative 
Oversight and the Courts found that the tribunal works effectively 
and needs no additional positions. It also asserted that new 
judgeships might threaten efficiency and circuit law's clarity and 
stability, in part by fostering inconsistent resolution and invocation of 
the en bane process.151 The Senate study further claimed that the 
tribunal performs well because it judiciously employs staff attorneys, 
screens through telephone conferences, restricts argument in "more 
significant cases" and allows no argument in "routine" appeals, 
permits informal briefs and summary dispositions, and uses 
prepublication opinion circulation to promote uniform decision-
making.152 Most of these measures conserve resources, but other 
approaches, such as leaving publication and counsel appointment for 
indigent pro se litigants in essence to one judge's discretion, can limit 
court access.153 Thus, although the Commission's raw data suggest the 
Fourth Circuit may operate less efficaciously than it could, this 
material is inconclusive and additional sources indicate the court 
functions rather well. 
Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 12-18 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson). Recent 
statistics agree. See U.S. Courts of Appeals, Median Time Intervals in Cases Terminated 
After Hearing or Submission, by Circuit During the 12-Month Period Ending Sept. 30, 
200I, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/appendices/ b04sep01.pdf {last visited Aug. 
22, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This may reflect the few 
published opinions and oral arguments afforded. 
150. See Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 14 (testimony of Chief 
Judge Wilkinson); see also Brooke Masters, Virginian May End the Impasse Over 
Integrating Court, WASH. POST, July 30, 2000, at Cl; supra note 139 and accompanying 
text. 
151. Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at l, 3. Accord Hearing Before the 
Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 13 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson). See generally 
Tobias, supra note 110, at 565 (assessing views regarding additional judgeships' effects on 
courts). 
152. See Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1-2; Hearing Before the 
Senate Judiciary, supra note 6, at 13 (testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson) (agreeing with 
the findings in the subcommittee report); 4TH CIR. R. 33, 34, 36, I.O.P. 36.3. The court 
resolves cases rather promptly, while any delay that might result from pre-publication 
opinion circulation may be offset by increased intra-circuit consistency. See Analysis of the 
Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1; Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary, supra note 6 
(testimony of Chief Judge Wilkinson); 4TH CIR. R. 36{a); supra note 149 and 
accompanying text. 
153. See 4TH OR. R. 34{b), 36(a). The recent study's scope, relative lack of empirical 
data, and political nature are controversial. However, the subcommittee clearly has 
authority to monitor the courts and their resources, and the subcommittee did attempt to 
gather some data and seek judges' perspectives that are informed by experience. 
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D. A Word About North Carolina Developments 
The significant number of Fourth Circuit vacancies and the 
protracted time they have remained open directly implicate North 
Carolina. The most salient development relating to North Carolina is 
that no judge from the state now serves on the Fourth Circuit.154 
Senator Helms often mentions this, but he is partly responsible for it. 
In the 1970s, Helms may have prevented the nomination of Julius 
Chambers, a renowned civil rights lawyer and former NAACP 
General Counsel, and Professor William Van Alstyne, a preeminent 
constitutional scholar at the Duke University School of Law, while 
during the Clinton Administration, Helms blocked consideration of 
Judge Beaty and Judge Wynn.155 On May 9, 2001, President Bush 
nominated Chief Judge Boyle of the Eastern District of North 
Carolina at Helms's apparent instigation, but he has not received a 
hearing.156 
Each state located within the purview of a specific appeals court 
should have a judge on the tribunal who is stationed in the 
jurisdiction, even though the judiciary is not a representative branch 
of the federal government. An appellate judge whose chambers are 
situated in a particular state generally will be more familiar with its 
substantive law, which may help resolve appeals that implicate 
diversity of citizenship,157 and with the jurisdiction's customs and 
mores, which can facilitate efforts to reconcile federal policies and 
more localized concems.158 The residents of a state may also have 
greater confidence in, and find more acceptable, the decisions of an 
154. See Firestone, supra note 1; Wagner, supra note 2. 
155. J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., a former Dean of the University of North Carolina School 
of Law, ultimately assumed the North Carolina seat. For events in the 1970s, see 
GOLDMAN, supra note 39, at 273-74; Peter G. Fish, Merit Selection and Politics: Choosing 
a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 635 (1979). For developments in the Clinton Administration, see supra notes 137-41 
and accompanying text. 
156. See PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 79, at 725; Firestone, supra note 1; see 
also Savage, supra note 4. See generally supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing 
Boyle's nomination). 
157. See 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). 
"Mastery of State Law" may be overvalued, especially given the rather few appeals from 
diversity cases. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 127, at 98; Carl Tobias, The Impoverished 
Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 EMORY L. J. 1357, 1373 (1995) (reporting that of the 225 
diversity cases appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the court affirmed three-fourths). 
158. This is the regional circuits' federalizing function. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 10-13 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing generally the role of the 
courts of appeals and federalization specifically); see also John Minor Wisdom, Requiem 
for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980) (discussing directly the federalizing 
role of the circuit courts). 
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appellate court that includes a member who lives in their home state. 
Indeed, when a regional circuit has no judge from a specific 
jurisdiction for an extended period, its residents could develop an 
unhealthy sense of estrangement from, and even distrust of, the 
appeals court system that propounds an expanding corpus of federal 
law that governs them.159 These phenomena will be accentuated as 
appellate caseload growth and a shrunken Supreme Court docket 
increasingly convert the regional circuits into the courts of last resort 
for their respective geographic areas.160 The Senate has traditionally 
honored the convention of having a member from every state in a 
regional circuit serve on the court, while Congress appears to have 
considered the notion so compelling that lawmakers recently codified 
it.161 However, Senator Helms's actions during the Clinton 
Administration and in the past necessitated departure from the 
practice for the Fourth Circuit. 
In sum, the earlier assessment of the generic vacancies problem 
and of the present difficulty suggests these components may have 
compromised the criminal and civil justice that the federal judiciary 
affords. This situation deserves prompt, effective treatment. The 
Essay's next segment explores a variety of approaches that officials in 
the three branches could institute to address the circumstances. 
II. ANALYSIS OF PREFERABLE SOLUTIONS 
This part surveys numerous remedies for unfilled appeals court 
vacancies, although several factors complicate the provision of 
definitive suggestions. First, it is impossible to predict which political 
party will capture disputed Senate seats, especially in North Carolina, 
and a chamber majority this November, although Senate control will 
be more critical than who wins the North Carolina race. Closely 
related is timing. Before the elections, Senators will confirm few 
159. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1989: Hearing on S.948 
Before Senate Judiciary Subcomm on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong. 247 (1990) (statement of Sen. Simpson). For an analysis of these 
and related issues, see BAKER, supra note 127, at 95-98; see also Ninth Circuit Split: 
Hearing on S.853 and S.956 Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 5 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Simpson). 
160. See POSNER, supra note 113, at 58-64, 80-81, 194-95 (discussing appeals growth 
and the Supreme Court's shrunken docket). See generally Hellman, supra note 118 
(examining the Supreme Court's shrunken docket). 
161. See Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 307, 111 Stat. 2440, 2493 (1997) 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (1994) by requiring each appellate court except the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to have "at least one circuit judge in 
regular active service appointed from the residents of each [state] in that circuit"). 
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nominees already submitted, much less process new ones. Pragmatic, 
political realities may mean that both parties must await the 
November returns. Nonetheless, some ideas can be offered by 
positing plausible scenarios. Thus, this section emphasizes the best 
measures that the President, the Senate, and the Judiciary could 
implement to rectify or ameliorate the political difficulties that have 
attended Fourth Circuit selection.162 
A. The Executive Branch and the Senate 
The President and Senators must do everything possible to 
improve the discharge of their judicial appointments duties. For 
instance, the Bush Administration and the Senate might undertake 
efforts to streamline those responsibilities for the process that each 
fulfills, while meticulously balancing analysis of nominees' character 
and competence with the need to expedite selection. 
Executive and legislative officers should treat increasing 
politicization and recognize that attempts to address it may be 
controversial and perhaps unsuccessful. The officials must work 
together, reach reasonable accommodations, and efficaciously resolve 
disputes when they occur. The officers should also cease participating 
in activities, such as recriminations over who is most responsible for 
delay, which are apparently animated by efforts to secure transitory 
political victories and by gamesmanship.163 Insofar as growing 
politicization slows the process and fosters the perception that 
government officials are sacrificing the best interests of the courts and 
the country for short-term partisan advantage, the phenomena could 
erode public respect. 
These ideas apply specifically to Fourth Circuit and North 
Carolina appointments. For example, the President might redouble 
his efforts to cooperate with Senators across the region by consulting 
them before he formally nominates designees. Proposal of a nominee 
for the second North Carolina opening provides an excellent 
opportunity to seek this advice. All Senate members from states 
162. See supra note 16. The persistent dilemma's best solution seems to be creation of 
enough new positions to accord the judiciary every judge now authorized because this 
would avoid certain theoretical, pragmatic, and legal problems. See Tobias, supra note 11, 
at 569-70 (suggesting solutions such as creating enough positions to compensate for the 
vacancies and creating floater judgeships). Other measures may only slightly decrease 
essentially irreducible temporal restraints. For exposition of many solutions, few of which 
apply to the Fourtlt Circuit, see id. at 552-72. 
163. See, e.g., Sargentich, supra note 13, at 1033-35; Editorial, Eliminating Unnecessary 
Delays in Filling Federal Judicial Vacancies, 83 JUDICATURE 100 (1999); Lloyd Cutler & 
Mickey Edwards, End the Judicial Blame Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2002, at A29. 
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located in the court should closely communicate about important 
issues, namely whether they will continue approving judges who are 
from the same jurisdictions in which vacancies arise. The two 
Senators representing each state in the Fourth Circuit must work 
together and find a suitable candidate when a vacancy occurs in a 
particular jurisdiction. They may even consider establishing an 
intrastate merit-selection group, which could resemble the Circuit 
Judge Nominating Commission employed by President Jimmy Carter 
or the district panel that Bush as well as California Democratic 
Senators Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer recently created.164 
That concept might resonate in North Carolina, particularly if 
Democrats retain the Senate and the new Senator wants to pursue a 
cooperative relationship. Indeed, the leadership of the North 
Carolina Bar Association recently proposed the creation of a 
"bipartisan commission ... to recommend federal judicial nominees" 
in an attempt "to break a bitter stalemate between North Carolina's 
two Senators."165 
B. The Executive Branch 
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush had some responsibility 
for the current openings.166 Bush may not have supplied enough 
capable nominees with moderate political views for the Judiciary 
Committee to process, and he must forward more names at a pace 
that \vill facilitate its work. In fairness, Bush might have proceeded 
cautiously because errors by a nascent administration can erode 
credibility, promote delay, and threaten selection. 
The President must assess and institute numerous conciliatory 
measures because that approach could prove to be more effective and 
he could rely on their prior invocation, should resort to less 
cooperative mechanisms be warranted. The President must apply 
practices that will enhance discharge of administration duties. For 
164. For the Carter Commission, see LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE 
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, 
PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A 
Comparison of the Reagan and Carter Administrations, 71 JlJDICATURE 136, 140 (1987). 
For the California panel, see Caria Marinucci, Feinstein, Boxer Given A Say Over Judges, 
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2001, at A3; Henry Weinstein, Judge Selection Process Set 
Up Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at Bl. 
165. Wagner, supra note 2; Editorial, Better Way: Plan Would Make Obstructionism 
Costly, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER, June 26, 2002, at SA. 
166. In early 1997 and 2001, each tendered few nominees, most of whom were well 
qualified and rather moderate, but Hatch and Leahy claimed some were not. See supra 
notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
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instance, Bush could expedite nominations by compiling lists of 
possible appellate court designees and expedite confirmation by 
urging that the Judiciary Committee and the FBI eliminate redundant 
investigation and evaluation.167 Bush should also examine the ABA's 
exclusion from advance candidate review, as this decision has 
increased delay due to Democratic insistence on informal ABA peer 
review.168 Other conciliatory ideas include submitting fewer nominees 
Democrats will oppose. illustrative was the 2001 selection of Judge 
Barrington Parker, whom Clinton had named to the district bench 
and the Senate promptly approved.169 Because most district judges 
can easily secure appointment to appeals courts, elevation remains a 
venerable technique.170 
The President should at least consider nominating more well-
qualified attorneys who have Democratic affiliations.171 This 
approach could be salutary in courts with protracted vacancies and 
large caseloads and which are located in states that traditionally vote 
for Democrats or have two Democratic Senators. The Sixth Circuit, 
which has seven of its sixteen seats open and the fourth largest 
docket, is a general instance, while Maryland, whose Senators 
blocked a Bush candidate's nomination, affords a Fourth Circuit 
example.172 The "Michigan seats" remain unfilled because the two 
167. Bush could enhance nomination and confirmation through consultation with the 
Judiciary Committee and with Senators and by implementing a merit-selection 
commission. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; Hearings on Judicial Nominations, 
supra note 92 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (urging the current Bush Administration to 
reconsider its decision to discontinue soliciting ABA advice before beginning the 
confirmation process). 
169. This occurred because Parker had been approved once, had Democrats' support, 
and had experience derived from prior service, which informed analysis of his abilities and 
character. The action resembled Clinton's elevation of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, whom 
former President George Bush had named. See Neil A. Lewis, After Delay, Senate 
Approves Judge for Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B2; see also supra 
note 117 and accompanying text (discussing the confirmations of Judge Gregory and 
Judge Parker). 
170. Bush's three predecessors relied upon the elevation of district judges. See Tobias, 
supra note 94, at 752; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Ruth Marcus, Bush Quietly Fosters Conservative Trend 
in Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1991, at A6. Clinton Administration examples include 
Second Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor and Fourth Circuit Judge William Traxler. See 
supra notes 143, 169 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
172. Candidates have been nominated to fill all of the vacancies on the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. VACANCIES, supra note 5. For analysis of Maryland, see Tobias, supra 
note 38, at 110, 114; Neil Lewis, Washington Talk: Road to Federal Bench Gets Bumpier in 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2001, at Al6. 
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parties' officials there cannot agree.173 For courts with numerous 
long-term vacancies and enormous caseloads, which are situated in 
states where those who proffer or can block designees are 
deadlocked, Bush could consider trade-offs, such as allowing 
Democratic proposals of half as many nominees as the Republicans.174 
He might even permit Democrats to suggest some candidates in 
exchange for a judgeships bill, thereby inaugurating a bipartisan 
judiciary, an idea that may generate much support in today's political 
climate.175 Bush could also agree with Senator Leahy on a 
prearranged number of nominees to be confirmed annually.176 
If attempts at improving selection through cooperation fail, the 
President might entertain and apply less conciliatory methods. For 
example, Bush could use his office as a bully pulpit to blame 
Democratic Senators or to cajole or shame them into greater action, 
while he might force the issue by taking it to the people. Related 
approaches are submission of nominees for all openings or selective 
reliance on recess appointments, each of which could pressure the 
Senate by publicizing or dramatizing how protracted vacancies 
threaten justice. A recess appointment probably led to Judge 
Gregory's confirmation, but real legal, political, and practical 
restraints limit the tool's utility.177 Bush has employed, or threatened 
173. See Groner & Ringel, supra note 9; Editorial, Senate Nomination Process Needs 
Repair, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2002, at 08, http://detnews.com/2002/editorial/0203/04/ 
a08-431361.htm {last visited Aug. 23, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review), 
available at 2002 WL 14869836; Editorial, The Federal Court Blockade, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, May 12, 2002, at G2, 2002 WL 18293981. 
174. Senator Biden suggested that Republicans contemplated a similar informal 
agreement, but he claimed this was not in line with the last 200 years of tradition. 143 
CONG. REC. S2538, S2541 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997); see also Lewis, supra note 87, 
(discussing Clinton's selection of federal judges and the conflict between a Republican 
Senate and a Democratic executive branch). Some object to "horsetrading" over 
judgeships. See Groner & Ringel, supra note 9. 
175. See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81, at 271. President Eisenhower made a 
similar offer in 1960. See id.; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing 
judgeships bill and Judicial Conference proposals). 
176. Bush might consider these ideas and should be realistic and pragmatic about 
filling vacancies. Bush should calculate how critical the openings are and may conclude 
that filling the bench is less important than certain principles, such as appointing the type 
of judges he prefers. 
177. For example, had Gregory not been confirmed, his opinions might arguably have 
lacked effect. The Second and Ninth Circuits have upheld the validity of recess 
appointments. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 715 (2d Cir. 1962); Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess 
Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 84 COLUM. L. REV.1758 (1984). 
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to employ, these measures as leverage over the Democratic Senate.178 
Nonetheless, he has invoked the techniques in a gingerly manner and 
has expressed concern about maintaining a dignified process.179 
Some of these measures apply to the Fourth Circuit as a general 
matter and to North Carolina specifically. For instance, consultation 
is a cost-free device that Bush should deploy. Insofar as the failure to 
do so prevented nomination of a lawyer for the "Maryland seat," he 
might broach future designees with the state's Senators.180 The 
President should similarly consult with the Senators from North 
Carolina when considering the second vacancy there. However, the 
political reality that none of the nominees, who are currently 
proposed will be confirmed in 2002, suggests awaiting the outcomes 
of the November elections.181 To the extent that Bush nominated 
Chief Judge Boyle at Senator Helms's request, the Senator's 
retirement may alleviate some pressure to force the confirmation 
issue.182 
C. The Senate 
All Senators should assess and institute cooperative actions 
because they may be as responsible as Presidents Clinton and Bush 
for the current situation. Republican Senators might remember that 
the Democratic Senate did confirm more judges, regardless of how 
politicized the process was, when Republicans were Presidents.183 
Democrats should keep in mind that the party may lose the Senate, 
the roles could again be reversed, and the public might blame them 
for delayed federal justice created by unfilled openings.184 
Therefore, Democratic Senators should also employ conciliatory 
approaches. They should generally be receptive to administration 
overtures, through responsive consultation, which affords frank 
candidate evaluations and prompt approval of any district judges 
178. See, e.g., supra note 95. 
179. See PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, supra note 79; Neil A. Lewis, Bush Appeals for His 
Picks for the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A29; see also supra note 95 (sharing 
Bush's tone in treating judicial confirmations). 
180. See supra note 172. 
181. Bush could be criticized because he nominated no one for the second vacancy. In 
fairness, Bush might have been waiting for the Senate to process other appellate nominees 
or Judge Boyle before proceeding. 
182. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Bush may press for approval apart 
from Helms so as not to appear weak. 
183. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Hartley & Holmes, supra note 
36. 
184. See supra note 95. 
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named by Clinton whom Bush might nominate for appeals courts. 
Specific cooperative possibilities abound. For example, when 
Democratic Senators are dissatisfied with Republican designees, they 
might propose more acceptable compromise candidates.185 
Insofar as the number of unfilled vacancies derived from slowed 
confirmation, Democratic leaders and Senators should apply 
measures that will facilitate the approval of more judges. For 
example, the Judiciary Committee could hold hearings and permit 
votes on additional nominees with truncated review and even 
abrogate ceremonial hearings for non-controversial candidates. To 
the extent that Senator Leahy has delayed specific designees' 
processing because their perceived political views are deemed 
unpalatable, venerable traditions and recent practice may suggest that 
nominees should receive hearings and Judiciary Committee votes.186 
The Senate Majority Leader should institute actions that will expedite 
full Senate consideration. Senator Daschle may want to permit votes 
on additional nominees by scheduling floor votes more promptly after 
notification of Judiciary Committee approval and by providing for 
increased floor debate and final votes.187 
All Senators should precisely balance the need for scrutiny with 
that for speed and approve nominees with the abilities and character 
to be fine judges. Democrats might carefully evaluate whether they 
assign ideology too much import, just as Republicans should abandon 
the quixotic quest to predict whether nominees would be "activist 
judges."188 The Article II provision for advice and consent envisions 
that Senators will assess professional attributes and character to 
185. Illustrative are 1997 efforts at consensus of Washington Senators Slade Gorton 
(R) and Patty Murray (D). See Callaghan, supra note 87; see also supra notes 164-65 and 
accompanying text. Leahy should reconcile discord over processes and candidates and 
mediate intractable disputes, perhaps with the aid of Senators Hatch or Lott. 
186. See supra notes 94, 108 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 79--84 and 
accompanying text. The party-line committee vote against Judge Pickering may be a 
"payback" for sinillar Republican actions. See supra note 95. Now that Leahy has 
sufficient, acceptable names to facilitate processing, Democrats might limit criticism of 
Bush. 
187. The debate preceding approval of Circuit Judges Merrick Garland, Marsha 
Berzon, and William Fletcher arguably engendered some candid, healthy exchange. See 
143 CONG. REC. S2515-41 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (Garland); 144 CONG. REC. Sl1872 
(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (Berzon and Fletcher); see also Neil A. Lewis, After Long Delays, 
Senate Confirms 2 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A16 (discussing the 
Ninth Circuit confirmation of Richard A Paez and Marsha L. Berzon, including the 
difficulties involved in the confirmation process). 
188. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Admin. Oversight and the Courts on Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 
2001, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 431 (2002); supra note 77. 
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ascertain nominee skill, honesty, and appreciation and respect for 
separated powers. However, Senators should not delay processing to 
discern how a lawyer, once confirmed, might decide specific cases as 
this could threaten judicial independence.189 
Democratic Senators should consider voting for nominees who 
exhibit the capacity and character to render excellent service, as 
Republican Senators often did when they had a Senate majority and 
Democrats controlled the presidency.190 In fairness, certain 
Democratic Senators seemingly resent Republican efforts to stall 
Clinton nominees, just as some Republican members apparently 
continue to resent the 1987 Senate rejection of Judge Bork and the 
acrimonious confirmation battle involving Justice Clarence Thomas, 
which are primarily ascribed to concerns about their future 
substantive decision making.191 
A few of these concepts pertain to the Fourth Circuit, in general, 
and North Carolina, specifically. Senator Helms's retirement should 
enable Senator Edwards to forge new links with whoever secures the 
North Carolina Senate seat in November.192 It may even be possible 
to address the situation that has prevented Republican Presidents 
from appointing a Fourth Circuit judge from North Carolina for eight 
decades and which thwarted Senate consideration of three Clinton 
189. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Sargentich et al., UNCERTAIN JUSTICE POLITICS AND 
AMERICA'S COURTS: THE REPORTS OF THE TASK FORCES OF CmZENS FOR 
INDEPENDENT COURTS, 1-75, 121-71, 205-42 (2000) (discussing judicial selection, the 
distinction between intimidation and legitimate criticism of judges, and the role of the 
legislature in establishing the power and jurisdiction of the courts); Judicial Independence 
and Accountability Symposium, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315-810 (1999) (exploring the 
distinction between independence of judges and accountability of the judiciary in general). 
190. See supra note 99. 
191. See, e.g., Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 81, at 256 (discussing the controversy 
surrounding the Bork and Thomas hearings); Melone, supra note 17, at 68 (detailing the 
arguments of Senators opposed to the manner in which the Bork hearings were 
conducted); Gest & Lord, supra note 102 (exploring the power struggle between 
Democrats and Republicans over judicial appointments). See generally GITENSTEIN, 
supra note 38 (discussing the rejection of Judge Bork); SENATOR PAUL SIMON, ADVISE & 
CONSENT 73-135 (1992) (discussing the Thomas confirmation battle). The Democratic 
opposition to President Bush's nominees can, perhaps, be distinguished by the enormous 
significance of Supreme Court appointments and the relatively limited Democratic 
scrutiny of, and resistance to, previous Republican lower court nominees. See 143 CONG. 
REC. S2538-41 (daily ed. Mar.19, 1997) (statements of Sen. Biden & Sen. Sarbanes). 
192. See generally Richard L. Berke, Echoes Aside, Dole Insists She Is No Clinton, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at A17 (discussing Senator Helms's plan to retire); Kevin Sack, The 
Jockeying Starts As Helms Yields to Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at A16 (same); 
Richard Simon & Greg Miller, Helms Expected to Retire At End of Term, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 22, 2001, at Al (same). 
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nominees.193 For instance, Senator Edwards might consider 
permitting the Senate to process Chief Judge Boyle's nomination, if 
President Bush proposes one of the individuals suggested by 
President Clinton.194 
D. The Judicial Branch 
Federal judges are considerably less able than the President and 
the Senate to effect constructive change because the Constitution 
delegates principal responsibility to the political branches.195 
Nevertheless, the judiciary might enhance attempts to publicize 
vacancies and the serious problems that they impose196 and suggest 
promising methods to facilitate selection that President Bush and the 
Senate could effectuate. 
Some ideas above apply to the Fourth Circuit. For example, 
Chief Judge Wilkinson has asserted that the court operates effectively 
absent a full judicial complement and does not need additional 
judgeships.197 A majority of active tribunal members recently asked 
Congress to approve no new Fourth Circuit positions,198 even as the 
court's judges affirmatively responded in the highest percentages to 
the Commission survey question whether expanding the tribunal 
would help it "correct prejudicial errors, minimize appellate litigation 
costs, avoid creating intercircuit [and intracircuit conflicts and] hear 
oral arguments."199 With all due respect, the percentages of written 
opinions and arguments that the Fourth Circuit affords suggest that 
the court might dispense more appellate justice or at least function 
193. See supra notes 125, 137-140 and accompanying text. 
194. Edwards reportedly opposed, but delayed blocking, Boyle's appointment until he 
could discuss Judge Wynn's possible nomination with President Bush. See Matthew 
Cooper & Douglas Waller, Bush's Judicial Picks Could Be a Battle Boyle, TIME, May 21, 
2001, at 22; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text (assessing a similar situation in 
Michigan). But see supra note 174 (proposing a similar tradeoff but admonishing that 
some object to "horsetrading"). 
195. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
196. This would increase public awareness of the problem of judicial vacancies and 
perhaps heighten executive and legislative branch officials' sensitivity to the need for 
expedition. 
197. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text. 
198. See Analysis of the Fourth Circuit, supra note 112, at 1; Tobias, supra note 94, at 
749. 
199. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 149, at 18-19. The conservative estimates of 
dockets, workloads and resources on which the Judicial Conference bases judgeship 
proposals for Congress may also suggest the court needs new seats. See Tobias, supra note 
94, at 753. But see CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 109, at 2-7 (discussing the formula 
used to calculate judgeship needs); Wilkinson, supra note 111, at 1161-63 (suggesting that 
increasing the number of judges will not benefit the judiciary). 
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better were every authorized position occupied.200 Therefore, the 
Chief Judge and his colleagues may want to reconsider whether the 
Fourth Circuit would function more effectively with a full contingent 
or even additional judges.201 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial vacancies significantly threaten the federal justice 
system. The problem consists of two major components. The first, 
the vacancies conundrum, is a persistent difficulty. Much delay that 
accompanies it is inherent and resists change, although some 
unwarranted delay can be remedied or ameliorated. The second is a 
current dilemma that is essentially political and which public officials 
could rectify if they muster the requisite political will. President Bush 
and the Senate must eliminate unnecessary delay. They should also 
attempt to depoliticize selection, stop criticizing one another, 
reconcile their partisan differences, and break the present impasse for 
the good of the judiciary and the nation. Senators Daschle, Leahy, 
Lott, and Hatch, as well as Attorney General John Ashcroft and 
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, may want to lead this effort. 
Senators who represent states located in the Fourth Circuit 
should cooperate as closely as possible within particular jurisdictions, 
among themselves, and with the White House. The November 
election of a new Senate member from North Carolina should 
provide the opportunity for a fresh start and possibly greater 
cooperation between the state's Senators. If the North Carolina 
members consult the suggestions above, they should be able to 
improve federal judicial selection in their jurisdiction, the Fourth 
Circuit, and perhaps the nation. 
200. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text. 
201. These are disputed, unresolved issues. See supra notes 139, 145-53 and 
accompanying text. 
